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Abstrak 
Proses India dalam mengkonsepsikan senjata nuklir sebagai alat politik telah melalui 
berbagai macam dinamika, baik dari faktor internal maupun faktor eksternal. Desakan faktor 
eksternal, yaitu kondisi keamanan yang terancam, diikuti dengan perdebatan antara 
pemerintah dan golongan terkemuka di India memunculkan pemahaman yang berbeda 
mengenai kebijakan nuklir. Kebijakan India dalam pengembangan senjata nuklir dilakukan 
dengan pendekatan yang berbeda dari pemahaman dunia internasional pada senjata nuklir 
pada umumnya memunculkan banyak kontroversi, dimana salah satunya adalah tidak 
menandatangani perjanjian non-proliferasi nuklir. Melalui tulisan ini, akan dibahas 
bagaimana India membuat kebijakan nuklir berdasarkan pemahaman mereka terkait 
penggunaan senjata nuklir dan mengapa India menolak menandatangani perjanjian non-
proliferasi nuklir. 
Kata kunci: kebijakan luar negeri, India, nuklir, pertahanan negara, perjanjian multilateral 
 
Introduction 
 
“India stands for the total elimination of all nuclear 
weapons and ushering in of a nuclear weapons free world. However, 
till such time as this is achieved, India will be constrained to keep 
her nuclear option open” 
 – Indian Ministry of Defence, 1996-97 
 
On May 1974, the whole world were shocked when India’s first preparations 
for a nuclear weapons test was caught unnoticed and, successfully conducted at 
Pokhran.1 The nuclear test was formally named ‘ Peaceful Nuclear Explosive’ (PNE) 
and famously referred to as the Smiling Buddha. As the name implies, the 
establishment of nuclear weapons test was never in the intention to entering the wars 
                                                          
1 Srinivas Laxmani, ‘“Smiling Buddha” Had Caught US off-Guard in 1974’, The Times of India, 
12 July 2011, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/amp39Smiling-Buddhaamp39-had-
caught-US-off-guard-in-1974/articleshow/11013437.cms. 
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of nuclear weapons. The Smiling Buddha was referred in the history of Vaishali’s 
destruction by Magadha. As the legend said, Buddha was upset with the thought of 
the war that could have been avoided if Vaishali choose to had deterrent military 
power rather than the direct democracy. As the nuclear weapons test acquiring 
deterrence for India, we can conclude that Buddha was happy with it.  
 The history of India’s attempt in achieving nuclear capability have gone 
through many pros and cons coming from internal and external factors. The prolog 
of India’s nuclear program started in the pre-independence era by a group of scientist 
under Homi Bhabha that find the significance of nuclear energy and actively 
persuaded political leaders to invest resources in the nuclear sector.2 It was then, 
supported with justification by India’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru stated 
that “As long as the world is constituted as it is, every country will have to devise and 
use the latest devices for its protection. I have no doubt India will develop her 
scientific researches and I hope Indian scientists will use the atomic force of 
constructive purposes. But if India is threatened, she will inevitably try to defend 
herself by all means at her disposal”.3 Nuclear weapons and energy development 
began with the objectives of attaining world power and improving the quality of life 
of the people and self-reliance in meeting the energy needs. 
Throughout the following years, the internal debate over whether India 
should develop a nuclear device has continued from scientist stance and politicians 
opposition. As the scientist argued that nuclear development was necessary as nuclear 
deterrent, pointing out the threats coming from China and Pakistan, the politicians 
opposed with economic and moral reasons, stated that nuclear weapons would not 
make India safer. They eventually emerged with acknowledging the demand in 
security interests as the China helped Pakistan in advancing the nuclear weapon 
                                                          
2 ‘About Us - Bhabha Atomic Research Centre(BARC)’, accessed 13 April 2017, 
http://www.barc.gov.in/about/index.html. 
3 M.V. Mathai, Nuclear Power, Economic Development Discourse and the Environment: The 
Case of India, Routledge Explorations in Environmental Studies (Taylor & Francis, 2013), 75, 
https://books.google.co.id/books?id=NBq2W_YUdpEC. 
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programs. The development of nuclear policy back then was influenced by India’s 
international security condition and followed by domestic aspects such as political 
change and bureaucratic elites. As the scientist have defended to keep nuclear 
programme alive, the bureaucratic elites helped in raising political awareness towards 
India’s declining on the development of nuclear weapons.4 As the involvement of 
bureaucratic elites stated that  India’s approach to nuclear weapons was in the purpose 
of reinforcing the dominant tendency towards political rather military approach,  
India sought to go nuclear, and this does not include on what India should do with 
nuclear weapons as India sees nuclear weapons as something to provide political 
space and strategic autonomy. 
India’s position towards nuclear development in international realms was not 
going smoothly in the first time. Despite India’s official stance in nuclear research 
and development programs are intended for peaceful purposes only, India has 
receives several opposition from other nuclear powers countries towards their 
perspective on nuclear weapons. India was an initial advocate of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBC) and rejected 
disarmament initiatives that based on a desire from non-discriminatory international 
agreements which would embrace both nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear 
weapon states and be set in the context of the complete elimination of nuclear 
weapons.5 India eventually refuse to sign NPT  as they see discriminatory within the 
treaty that denies other countries nuclear right and less at disarmament. India sees the 
NPT as a threat to international stability and has repeatedly touted its “exemplary 
non-proliferation record of four decades and more.”. Through this, India does not 
think nuclear weapons can stabilized the region as the NPT standpoint, it rather 
increases the nuclear risk in the region and seen as irresponsible.  
                                                          
4 Bōeichō Bōei Kenkyūjo (Japan), Major Powers’ Nuclear Policies and International Order in 
the 21st Century, NIDS International Symposium on Security Affairs (National Institute for 
Defense Studies, 2010), 95, https://books.google.co.id/books?id=Vo_eYgEACAAJ. 
5 Shuja, S. M. (2001). India and nuclear weapons. American Asian Review, 19(3), 103-119. 
Retrieved from https://search.proquest.com/docview/211380278?accountid=31495 
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As the concept of India’s nuclear policy was built with the involvement of 
various actors and influenced by how India sees nuclear weapon differently than other 
nuclear power countries, this paper will analyze India’s nuclear policy and 
understanding the reason why India refused to sign the NPT.  
 
Theoretical Framework 
To acknowledge the reason behind India’s rejection towards Non-
Proliferation Treaty, offense-defense theory and Scott Sagan “Models of 
Nuclearization” will be the primary framework in understanding India’s nuclear 
doctrine. First, we will explain the reason behind India’s nuclearization with Scott 
Sagan “Models of Nuclearization” and then analyze India’s nuclear perspective with 
basic variables from Offense-defense Theory by Robert Jervis. By understanding 
India’s nuclearization and nuclear perspective, we will understand the concept of 
India’s nuclear policy how that policy made India rejected the NPT.  
Offense Defense Theory   
 Offense-defense theory is built under Theory of International Politics and 
argues how major war can be avoided by advantaging defense over offense. This 
theory consists with two variables as described by Robert Jervis, (1) the offense-
defense balance argued whether it is easier to take territory or to defend it, and (2) 
offense-defense distinguishability – whether the forces that support offensive 
missions are different from those that support defensive missions.6 Offense-defense 
variables are influenced by the work on structural realism, which reflects a state’s 
ability to convert the power into  military capabilities. Through this we can conclude 
that offense-defense balance set the cost ratio of the forces the attacker required to 
take territory to the cost of the forces the defender has deployed.7  
                                                          
6 Charles L. Glaser and Chairn Kaufmann, ‘What Is the Offense-Defense Balance and How 
Can We Measure It?’, International Security 22, no. 4 (1998): 44–82. 
7 Ibid. 
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 As offense-defense balance determine the cost ratio, we can also ensure 
state’s potential military capability and its ability to maintain its security as well as 
achieving non-security goals. The cost of fighting is set by employing conservative 
defense planning standards that are traditionally employed by defenders with 
assumption that other states likely to have expansionary objective and could only be 
deterred by the prospect of suffering the high losses in a war. Through this, the 
offense-defense balance will become the minimum investment ratio which the 
attacker can not only take territory without acceptable cost of fighting.  
 Within the nuclear studies, the comparisons between attacker’s value for 
territory to the costs that the attacker would incur as a result of nuclear retaliation 
against its society. Through this, offense-defense balance will be the ration of the cost 
of forces required to undermine the defender’s assured destruction capability to the 
cost of the defender’s forces as the retaliatory damage determined the effectiveness 
of forces towards defense advantage.8  
 
Models of Nuclearization by Scott Sagan 
Scott Sagan’s Models of Nuclearization focused on the reason of why states 
decide to build or refrain from developing nuclear weapons. Within this, Scott Sagan 
concludes an examination of the policy dilemmas produced by the existence of these 
three models.  
 The first model is The Security Model that stressed on nuclear weapons and 
international threats. The main idea of this model came from neorealist theory 
statement towards the existential states in an anarchical international system that 
relied on self-help to protect their sovereignty and national security.9  In the context 
of  nuclear weapons as weapon mass destruction, to maintain its national security, 
state must balance against any rival that develops nuclear weapons by gaining access 
                                                          
8 Ibid., 4. 
9 R.H. Wagner, War and the State: The Theory of International Politics (University of 
Michigan Press, 2010), 21, https://books.google.co.id/books?id=nak4H9tTTvYC. 
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to a nuclear deterrent itself.10 Through this, there are several policy implications that 
coming through the logic of the security model itself. First, states that face nuclear 
opponent will eventually develop their own arsenals unless credible alliance with a 
nuclear power exist. To gain confidence and build measures, nuclear states 
determined to not use their weapon against non-nuclear states. Through the Security 
model logic, NPT is seen as an institution that permitting non-nuclear states to 
overcome a collective action problem.11 
 The second Model is The Domestic Politics Model that focuses on domestic 
role in influencing the government decisions towards nuclear weapons. As the 
establishment of nuclear weapons could not be separated from the interest of 
bureaucratic or political interests, this model will stressed on how domestic actor 
affecting in pursuing the bomb. There are three kinds of actors that include in the case 
studies of proliferation according to this model; the state’s nuclear energy 
establishment, units within the professional military, and politicians that favor nuclear 
weapons acquisition.12 The approach of the model is influenced by the study if 
bureaucratic politics and the social construction of technology concerning military 
procurement in the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Through 
the study, bureaucratic actors are seen as the one who construct the favoritism towards 
weapons acquisition by propagate extreme perception of foreign threats, promoting 
supportive politicians, and actively lobbying for increased defense spending. Through 
domestic politics perspective, nuclear weapons programs are seen as solutions not 
directly to international security problems, as it is produced by responses from 
domestic actors. There is also feasibility that nuclear weapons programs can be also 
perceive as opportunity for gaining parochial interests.  
                                                          
10 Scott D. Sagan, ‘Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a 
Bomb’, International Security 21, no. 3 (1996): 5, doi:10.2307/2539273. 
11 Ibid., 12. 
12 Ibid., 14. 
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 The last Model is The Norms Model that concerned on the standard of 
weapon acquisition by seeing the symbolic functions that reflects a state’s identity. 
This model questioned the deeper norms and shared beliefs on the actions that 
legitimate and appropriate in international relations. Within the subject of nuclear 
weapons, the development towards international norms of the nuclear weapons 
acquisition have emerges to valuable alternative perspective on proliferation. From 
the sociology, the importance of the interests of individuals and organizations that 
shaped by the social roles actors promotes structures and behaviors that proven as 
rational and legitimate. Through this, military organizations become envisioned to 
serve similar functions to modern states as it is believed to possess legitimation. This 
enlighten the possibility of nuclear weapons programs served as symbolic functions 
that reflects leader perceptions of appropriate and modern behavior. The norms model 
produces a more optimistic vision of the potential future of nonproliferation as it gives 
suggestion that nuclear reactions as emerging security threats can be avoided or 
delayed with normative constraints.13 As the NPT regime eventually viewed with 
more optimism as it envisions the possibility of gradual emergence of a norm against 
all nuclear weapons possession, this model can predict that there will be severe costs 
involved if the nuclear powers are seen to have failed to make significant progress 
toward nuclear disarmament. 
 
Analysis 
 When India decide to pursue achieving nuclear-capable country, the key 
points in the decision relies on the propositions on nuclear weapons development 
which consists of National Security, National Prestige, and domestic politics.14 Now 
                                                          
13 Ibid., 32. 
14 Sharif M Shuja, India’s Nuclear Bomb and the Non-Proliferation Regimes / by Shuja, Sharif 
M, Research Paper (Bond University. Centre for East-West Cultural and Economic Studies) ; 
No. 7., Accessed from http://nla.gov.au/nla.cat-vn245638 (Gold Coast, Qld: Bond 
University, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, 1999), 110. 
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we will comprehend the process of India’s nuclearization by the key points that have 
been mentioned earlier and Scott Sagan models.  
Within National Security, this key concept mainly born by India-Pakistan 
ongoing heated relationship as the environment of anarchy open the possibility of 
security dilemma and thus, all possible measurements will be taken to ensure its 
national survival. From here, we see the first model which is The Security Model, as 
the variable of National Security established the reason behind India’s nuclearization 
throughout overwhelming threats that envisions India to serve deterrents. The nuclear 
weapons decisions was built because the growing threats from Pakistan which backed 
up with China developing the Bomb. India who faced the bomb from their opponent 
will eventually develop its own arsenal as the current political uncertainties 
concerned India. Through this, India regained the negativity towards the Non-
Proliferation Treaty as their concern on achieving National Security contradictive 
with NPT permitting non-nuclear states to become nuclear capable states. From NPT, 
states with nuclear capable will not use their weapons against non-nuclear states, this 
does not ensure the security gains from non-nuclear capable. India’s National 
Security was in threat from nuclear capable states coming from China and Pakistan 
even before India become Nuclear capable states. Through this, article VI from the 
treaty that stated “negotiations in food faith on measures relating to cessation of 
nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament” only seen by India as 
something to restrain the non-nuclear states from becoming capable and not including 
the incentives of  National Security towards non-nuclear states.  
From the National Prestige, India believes that nuclear weapons will be 
functioning to serve the state power as the acquisition of nuclear power seen as a 
symbol of prestige and tool in International politics. This linked to the Norms Model 
of Scott Sagan that seen nuclear weapon acquisition as symboling functions that serve 
a state’s identity and also giving importance towards deeper norms and shared beliefs 
on nuclear weapons power within international realm. As India’s actions to build 
nuclear weapon does not only in response to threats from Pakistan and China but also 
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established the skepticism towards NPT, this disseminate India to feel inferior by 
making a structure of power where they have a little influence. Through this, India 
has shared their norms regarding the nuclear weapons as they see the importance of 
constructing the shared international norm that refrain non-nuclear capable to hold 
power in international realm. Throughout the Norms model,  the international 
relations seen the symbolic function of nuclear acquisition only to be acknowledge 
by joining the nuclear war and therefore, have not assessing the progress toward 
nuclear disarmament as the NPT norms mostly influenced by the stronger country 
norms, this did not consider the importance of national prestige, as they consider 
international prestige more. Through this, we sees nonproliferation norms as group 
beliefs that embedded in domestic institutions and therefore, refuse to acknowledge 
the National Prestige of the states. 
Lastly, from the domestic politics influence towards India’s acquisition of 
nuclear weapons, we can see that the establishment of India’s nuclearization can not 
be separated from politicians influence.  Bureaucratic elites had helped in raising the 
awareness of the importance of nuclear weapons as India’s security and expand 
political contribution towards the development of nuclear weapons. Analyze within 
Scott Sagan’s Domestic Politics model, political interest plays big part in establishing 
the development of nuclear weapons in India. First, the establishment of nuclear 
energy was declined by bureaucratic elites and influence disapproval came from 
government and the citizens of India. After bureaucratic elites acknowledge the 
nuclear threat coming from Pakistan and China, they strive to raise awareness towards 
the importance for India in developing nuclear weapons, and thus, affecting the 
government and citizens to approve India’s acquisition of nuclear weapon. Political 
influence also played big role in the development of an Indian nuclear deterrent as 
one of the main perspective of India’s nuclear doctrine and as politicians favoring the 
nuclear weapons acquisition raised acceptance towards public and government, this 
proven that domestic politics has contribution to India’s nuclear decision.  
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Throughout the process of India’s nuclearization and the establishment of 
India’s nuclear doctrine, we can see that India have different interpretation towards 
nuclear weapons and thus creating different aim within their capability in nuclear 
deterrence. The main motive of India’s nuclear weapon establishment was to defend 
their national security from external threat coming from Pakistan and China, India 
seek defense domination within their nuclear weapon acquisition. Through this, the 
measurement that India has taken into their nuclear defense was to pursue a doctrine 
of credible minimum deterrence which focused on ‘retaliation only’ and only focused 
on the survivability of the arsenal. India prosecute their own definition of peacetime 
posture aims at convincing any potential aggressor that consists of; (1). Any threat of 
use of nuclear weapons against India shall invoke measures to counter the threat; and, 
(2). Any nuclear attack on India and its forces shall result in punitive retaliation with 
nuclear weapons to inflict damage unacceptable to the aggressor.15 Through their 
stance to use nuclear weapons for defensive purposes, the forces capability only to 
defend the nuclear weapons from any threat that can destroy the nuclear weapons and 
this ensure that the military can perform in maximum ability in defending the nation’s 
security. India with their nuclear weapons help the main defensive forces in assuring 
India to defend their territory as well their national security 
 
Conclusions 
 Through the background until analyzing the reason of nuclearization and 
India’s perspective towards nuclear weapons, we can conclude that the different view 
towards nuclear weapons is the main reason on why India rejected the NPT. First, 
India main reason in establishing nuclear weapons was for defensive purposes to 
achieve nuclear security but non-proliferation treaty made it difficult for India to 
defend their nuclear security as there is limitation for non-nuclear states to develop 
nuclear weapons. Thus, India seen NPT as an obstacle for achieving their national 
                                                          
15 ‘India’s Nuclear Doctrine and Policy’, accessed 18 April 2017, https://www.idsa-
india.org/an-feb-1.01.htm. 
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security as it is proven to not consider the national security for non-nuclear states. 
Second, India seen the international norms that accepted in a NPT not considering the 
national prestige of nuclear-capable states. As India believes that nuclear weapons 
served as a symbol of state power, this contradicted with NPT norms. India also 
refused to join the nuclear wars as they used the nuclear weapons solely to defended 
themselves. This also contradicted the international norms that NPT shared towards 
acquisition of nuclear weapons only acknowledged by joining the nuclear wars. 
Lastly, as the domestic politics have big influence in building india’s nuclear doctrine, 
this consider the establishment of nuclear weapon as political weapons rather than 
actual weapons, which are not accepted by the perspective within NPT. 
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